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Plaintiff Epic Systems Corporation is suing defendants YourCareUniverse, Inc., 
MEDHOST of Tennessee, Inc., and MEDHOST Direct, Inc. under both state and federal law 
on the grounds that defendants’ YOURCAREEVERYWHERE mark infringes Epic’s 
trademark for CARE EVERYWHERE and results in unfair competition. Defendants have 
moved for summary judgment, Dkt. 113, arguing that no reasonable jury could find that 
their mark is likely to confuse potential customers, which is an element of all of Epic’s claims. 
In the alternative, defendants seek summary judgment on Epic’s request under 15 U.S.C. § 
1117(a) for attorney fees and enhanced damages. 
The primary fact in Epic’s favor is that both marks include the same words. But nearly 
all the other factors governing a likelihood of confusion analysis favor defendants or are 
neutral. Although Epic and MEDHOST offer some of the same products, the marked 
products (an “interoperability” application and a health and wellness website) are very 
different. There is no evidence that anyone has been confused by defendants’ mark and there 
is strong evidence that defendants did not intend to copy Epic’s mark or use 
YOURCAREEVERYWHERE to deceive potential customers. Several other factors favor 
defendants as well: the marks use commonplace words; the context of defendants’ mark 
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generally makes its source clear; prospective customers generally use a great deal of care in 
choosing the relevant products and services; and the parties have little overlap in their 
customers. Even if it is assumed that potential customers associate CARE EVERYWHERE 
with Epic’s product, the possibility of customer confusion is simply too remote and 
speculative to require a trial. Accordingly, the court will grant defendants motion for 
summary judgment, which makes it unnecessary to consider defendants’ alternative argument 
regarding Epic’s request for relief under § 1117(a).  
Several other motions are before the court as well: (1) defendants’ motion to exclude 
the testimony of one of Epic’s experts, Michael Cohen, Dkt. 118; (2) defendants’ motion to 
strike Epic’s jury demand, Dkt. 120; (3) Epic’s motion to amend its damages report, 
Dkt. 194; and (4) defendants’ motion for leave to amend their answer to assert the 
affirmative defense of abandonment, Dkt. 202; (5) defendants’ motion to compel discovery, 
Dkt. 224; (6) Epic’s motion for an extension of time to respond to defendants’ motion to 
compel, Dkt. 226; and (7) Epic’s motion to compel discovery, Dkt. 228. 
The court will deny all of these motions as moot. Epic did not rely on Cohen’s 
testimony or opinions in its own proposed findings of fact. Although Epic cited Cohen’s 
testimony a few times in responses to defendants’ proposed facts, none of that testimony 
makes any difference to the outcome of defendants’ summary judgment motion. The 
remaining motions have no bearing on summary judgment, so it is unnecessary to consider 
them. 
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UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The undisputed facts are taken from the parties’ proposed findings of fact and the 
record. The court has disregarded proposed facts that did not comply with the court’s 
procedures. For example, when responding to the other side’s proposed findings of fact, the 
parties often included additional facts that were not responsive to the original fact.1 Dkt. 45, 
at 14 (“When a responding party disputes a proposed finding of fact, the response must be 
limited to those facts necessary to raise a dispute. The court will disregard any new facts that 
are not directly responsive to the proposed fact.”). The court also excluded vague or 
conclusory proposed facts and responses that did not comply with the requirement to provide 
“specific facts” at summary judgment.2 Drake v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 887 
(7th Cir. 1998) (“Rule 56 demands something more specific than the bald assertion of the 
general truth of a particular matter[;] rather it requires affidavits that cite specific concrete 
facts establishing the existence of the truth of the matter asserted.@).   
                                                 
1 E.g., Dkt. 170, ¶ 23, (disputing fact about programs that CARE EVERYWHERE application 
is used “in connection with” on ground that CARE EVERYWHERE mark is not used on 
those programs); Dkt. 169, ¶ 82 (not disputing fact but adding more information); id., ¶ 146, 
(disputing fact about products that include the YOURCAREEVERYWHERE mark with 
information regarding how defendants use mark for marketing); id., ¶ 152 (disputing fact 
about registering an account on defendants’ website with information about how defendants 
“promote[] and sell[]” their products and services); id., ¶ 162 (disputing fact about how 
products function with information about how products are marketed); id., ¶ 195 (disputing 
fact about Epic’s direct customers with information about customers who license Epic’s 
products from direct customers). 
2 E.g., Dkt. 170, ¶ 18 (“All Epic’s applications and modules are important for Epic’s 
customers to meet their patient care and patient engagement objectives.”); id., ¶ 28 (“Epic . . . 
facilitates a network of providers participating in a health information exchange.”); id., ¶ 69 
(“MEDHOST addressed the rising consumerism in the marketplace through marketing and 
sale of the YourCareUniverse products and services.”); id., ¶ 79 
(“YOURCAREEVERYWHERE provides ‘front door’ access to the MEDHOST provider’s 
patient portal.”); id., ¶ 91 (“Epic . . . has developed substantial good will in its CARE 
EVERYWHERE mark.”). 
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A. Epic Systems Corporation 
1. General background 
Plaintiff Epic Systems Corporation is a healthcare information technology vendor with 
about 10,000 employees. Epic’s primary product is “EpicCare,” an electronic health records 
(EHR) system. Epic provides one version of its system to hospitals and another version to 
clinics. 
Among other things, an EHR system such as EpicCare may include medical 
information about a patient, allow access to evidence-based tools that healthcare providers 
can use to make decisions about a patient’s care, and automate and streamline scheduling 
and billing. One purpose of an EHR system is to allow providers across more than one 
healthcare organization to share and exchange patient information. This sharing of digitized 
records across providers is sometimes called “interoperability.” 
2. CARE EVERYWHERE 
CARE EVERYWHERE is Epic’s interoperability “application” used to exchange 
patient data between and among healthcare institutions.3 It allows patient data to be 
exchanged between various end points, which include Epic facilities, non-Epic facilities, 
personal health records, health information exchanges, and various governmental entities. 
In May 2004, Epic applied for federal registration of CARE EVERYWHERE. In June 
2005, the United States Patent and Trademark Office registered the mark. In June 2011, the 
                                                 
3 The parties use terms inconsistently to describe the software at issue in this case. For 
example, they seem to use “platform” and “application” interchangeably. E.g., Dkt. 170, ¶ 20, 
(“CARE EVERYWHERE is Epic’s interoperability application . . .”); id., ¶ 23 (“CARE 
EVERYWHERE’s interoperability platform also supports . . .”). 
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USPTO accepted Epic’s Section 8 and 15 application, rendering Epic’s mark “incontestable.” 
Epic has not registered CARE EVERYWHERE in Wisconsin. 
From 2009 to 2014, Epic also used CARE EPIC and CARE ELSEWHERE in 
conjunction with CARE EVERYWHERE. Epic stopped using these other two marks because 
some had expressed confusion about the three marks. Some people referred to one or more of 
the marks incorrectly as “Care Anywhere” and others simply had difficulty remembering the 
CARE EVERYWHERE name. 
The purpose of CARE EVERYWHERE is to “help traveling patients get care 
regardless of where they are.” Dkt. 169, ¶ 28. The name “Care Everywhere” is meant to 
evoke “something to both patients and providers, which is anywhere you get your care, there 
can be [a] composite record of all of that care in one place. So anywhere you go, we can pull 
information from CARE EVERYWHERE.” Id., ¶ 29. 
CARE EVERYWHERE is part of EpicCare, which hospitals and clinics must license to 
have access to CARE EVERYWHERE. Along the same lines, a healthcare provider cannot 
gain access to CARE EVERYWHERE unless he or she works at a facility that has a license to 
use EpicCare. A provider using an EHR system other than Epic’s must gain access to CARE 
EVERYWHERE through another Epic product. Epic uses the CARE EVERYWHERE mark in 
the context of training, installation, implementation, and maintenance related to the 
interoperability application. 
3. Other Epic products used with CARE EVERYWHERE 
CARE EVERYWHERE’s interoperability application may be used “in connection 
with” individual modules that are also part of EpicCare, including a personal health record 
management tool, clinical and administrative modules used by healthcare professionals, and a 
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population health management system. Dkt. 170, ¶ 23. One of the modules is an application 
called MyChart, which is a “shared patient record” or “patient portal.” MyChart “offers 
patients personalized and secure online access to portions of their medical records and 
permits patients to include and share with providers disease/health and wellness 
information.” Dkt. 170, ¶ 32. MyChart permits patients to review their test results and visit 
summaries, schedule appointments, download records, and communicate directly with their 
physicians. MyChart is available only to patients of healthcare providers who are affiliated 
with Epic. Within the past three years, CARE EVERYWHERE “functionality” was added to 
MyChart. This allows for the exchange of records with a different provider. A patient may see 
the CARE EVERYWHERE logo in MyChart when using this functionality.  
Another module is called “Lucy,” which allows patients to collect their records in one 
place. CARE EVERYWHERE allows patients using Lucy to transfer records to different 
providers or to a MyChart account.  
4.  Customer use of CARE EVERYWHERE 
Epic allows its customers to use its marks on their consent forms and websites so long 
as they properly attribute the mark to Epic and otherwise use the mark appropriately. Out of 
18 customers for which Epic provided defendants relevant documents, seven of those 
customers had used CARE EVERYWHERE incorrectly, either not attributing the mark to 
Epic or attributing the mark to the wrong products and services.4 Epic relies on its employees 
to detect and correct customer noncompliance. 
                                                 
4 In its reply materials, defendants identified additional instances of Epic’s customers 
allegedly using CARE EVERYWHERE incorrectly, Dkt. 169, ¶ 101, but the court has not 
included these because Epic has not had any opportunity to respond. 
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5. Direct customers 
Epic has approximately 400 customers that obtain a license directly through Epic. The 
vast majority of these customers are large healthcare organizations. Other customers include 
“community” hospitals, retail clinics, and independent practices. Most of the smaller 
organizations share patients with Epic’s larger customers. The smallest facility has 100 beds. 
Epic’s direct customers are “sophisticated” and they put “a lot of care and resources” into 
choosing an EHR system. Dkt. 96 (Faulkner Dep., at 270); Dkt. 91 (DeVault Dep., at 222).  
The sales process often begins with a prospective customer issuing a “request for 
proposal” to various health IT vendors. After the customer narrows the list of vendors, those 
on the short list will give product demonstrations. The process for purchasing an EHR system 
usually lasts six months to one year. During the sales process, Epic typically interacts with 
high level executives and representatives of practitioners. Many of Epic’s potential customers 
also use consultants who are familiar with and experienced in the healthcare IT industry and 
the request-for-proposal process. The chief information officer and other high level executives 
are involved in the final decision to purchase an EHR system from Epic because of the 
significant cost of the system, the necessary hardware to implement the system, and the 
training needed to use the system. The licensing fee can range from $1.5 million for a small 
customer to $20 million for a large customer. Because CARE EVERYWHERE is included in 
EpicCare, there is no separate fee for the application. 
No organization that has purchased Epic’s EHR system has elected to switch to a 
different vendor later. 
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6. Community Connect program 
For approximately 10 years, Epic has had the Community Connect program, which 
allows smaller hospitals and physician practices to use the Epic EHR System. Typically, 
Connect participants are small independent practices with one to five providers or small 
community hospitals with about one to 200 beds. At least 1,500 organizations participate in 
the Connect program. Under the program, a Connect participant is able to use the Epic 
software through Epic’s direct customers in the same ways that Epic’s direct customers use 
the software. Connect participants can receive training and support from Epic. 
Generally, Connect participants have a contract with one of Epic’s larger customers 
rather than with Epic itself. However, Epic may receive a financial benefit from Connect 
participants because of increased usage by the direct customer. Connect participants are 
ordinarily geographically near to a direct customer and share patients with that customer. 
Prospective Connect participants generally hear about Epic through interactions with Epic’s 
direct customers. 
7. Epic’s marketing and sales 
Epic and its CARE EVERYWHERE products and services are “widely known” in the 
healthcare marketplace. Dkt. 170, ¶ 46. Prospective customers “often” mention CARE 
EVERYWHERE as an aspect of the Epic EHR system that they have heard about and are 
interested in. Most people in the industry, including prospective customers, already know 
what CARE EVERYWHERE is when they contact Epic. However, Epic has never conducted 
any survey, poll, search, study, or other investigation to determine whether CARE 
EVERYWHERE has acquired secondary meaning in the minds of consumers. 
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 Epic does not have a marketing department. It does not buy advertising space or cold 
call potential customers. Most customers contact Epic first, often because of a 
recommendation from another customer. Epic promotes its products and services primarily 
through word of mouth and the results from rating agencies and trade shows. Epic’s “Events 
and Design Team” promotes Epic’s products and services at user group meetings and industry 
conferences. Since 2014, Epic has spent approximately $100 million on marketing and 
promotion of its products. 
 Epic does have a sales team. Generally, the team responds to inquiries made from 
prospective customers rather than the other way around. Initial discussions are held by 
telephone and then may lead to face-to-face meetings. When Epic meets with a prospective 
customer, Epic may recommend the Community Connect program if the customer is not the 
appropriate size or does not have a large IT department. 
8. Patients’ exposure to CARE EVERYWHERE 
Epic does not market or sell the CARE EVERYWHERE product or any other product 
or service to healthcare patients. Patients might see the mark when completing consent forms 
regarding the sharing of data, when using the MyChart patient portal, or on an Epic 
customer’s website. When the mark appears on the MyChart portal, it appears along with the 
CARE EVERYWHERE logo: 
 
10 
 
B. Defendants YourCareUniverse, Inc., MEDHOST of Tennessee, and MEDHOST 
Direct 
1. General background 
Defendant YourCareUniverse, Inc. is a subsidiary of MEDHOST Solutions Corp., 
which is a subsidiary of MEDHOST, Inc. YourCareUniverse “offers a range of software tools 
and services that assist healthcare providers in managing the business of healthcare.” Dkt. 
169, ¶ 115.  
Defendant MEDHOST of Tennessee, Inc. sells an EHR system called Enterprise. 
Defendant MEDHOST Direct is a subsidiary that provides hosting and managed services 
both internally to MEDHOST affiliates and externally to customers of MEDHOST. All of 
these companies are “related or affiliated corporate entities.” Dkt. 160, ¶ 5. 
2.  YOURCAREEVERYWHERE 
In 2013, defendants began planning for products using different marks beginning with 
“YourCare.” The first product, launched in February 2014, was a patient portal called 
YOURCARECOMMUNITY (since renamed YOURCAREHEALTH). This was followed by 
YOURCARELINK, which is an “interface engine” that allows the transfer of information to a 
state health reporting agency. By October 2014, YOURCAREEVERYWHERE was the 
proposed named for a health and wellness website and related services.  
After learning that yourcareeverywhere.com was an available web domain, defendants 
conducted a search for similar marks. Defendants discovered Epic’s CARE EVERYWHERE 
mark at that time.  
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Defendants hired an advertising agency to perform a survey to test the name 
YOURCAREEVERYWHERE, along with two other names. Sixty five percent of the 
respondents chose YOURCAREEVERYWHERE as their preferred name.  
Defendants launched the yourcareeverywhere.com website in March 2015. At the 
same time, they executed a marketing campaign for the website, spending approximately 
$2,500,000. When advertising products and services for YOURCAREEVERYWHERE, 
defendants use the YOURCAREEVERYWHERE mark. In most of the advertisements, the 
mark appears alongside the YOURCAREUNIVERSE mark, the MEDHOST mark, or other 
“YourCare” marks.  
Epic has identified two instances in which the YOURCAREEVERYWHERE mark has 
appeared without being clearly unaccompanied by one of defendants’ other marks. Dkt. 145-
65 and 145-66. (Epic cites two other documents, Dkt. 145-28 and Dkt. 145-29, but either 
the MEDHOST mark or numerous YOURCAREUNIVERSE marks are prominent.) One is a 
brochure for YOURCAREEVERYWHERE “engagement services.” (The MEDHOST mark 
appears at the bottom of the brochure, but it is not prominent.) The other is a press release 
announcing the YOURCAREEVERYWHERE website. (The YOURCAREUNIVERSE mark 
appears in the document, but again, it is not prominently displayed.) In both documents, the 
YOURCAREEVERYWHERE mark appears with a YOURCAREEVERYWHERE logo. Epic 
has identified three documents (two press releases and a brochure) in which the 
YOURCAREEVERYWHERE mark did not appear with the logo. Dkt. 169, ¶ 144. In each 
document without the logo, the MEDHOST mark, the YOURCAREUNIVERSE mark or 
both are prominent. 
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In April 2015, the USPTO allowed defendants’ YOURCAREEVERYWHERE mark 
over Epic’s CARE EVERYWHERE mark. 
3. Other “YourCare” marks 
 Eventually, defendants chose to brand a number of other products as part of 
YOURCAREUNIVERSE and identify all of them with a different “YourCare” mark. 
Defendants now use many other marks with the “YourCare” prefix, including the following:  
 YOURCAREANALYTICS 
 YOURCARELINK 
 YOURCAREREFERRAL 
 YOURCARETRANSFER  
 YOURCAREHEALTH 
 YOURCAREPROVIDER 
 YOURCARESUCCESS 
 YOURCAREDATA 
 YOURCAREEXCHANGE 
 YOURCAREINTERACT 
 YOURCARENAVIGATION 
 YOURCAREWELLNESS 
 YOURCARECOMMUNITY 
 YOURCAREKNOWLEDGE 
 YOURCAREMESSENGER 
 YOURCAREVISUALIZE 
 
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board rejected defendant YourCareUniverse’s 
application to register “YourCare” on the ground that it is descriptive. The board also 
rejected YourCareUniverse’s contention that it owned a “family of marks.” 
Each of the “YourCare” products and services can be purchased separately and 
function independently, both as to each other and as to MEDHOST’s EHR system. For 
example, defendants’ YOURCAREEVERYWHERE website can link with any health portal, 
regardless whether the portal is affiliated with defendants. Defendants’ 
YOURCAREHEALTH patient portal can be used without MEDHOST’s EHR system. 
However, when customers of YourCareUniverse purchase products and services related to 
YOURCAREEVERYWHERE, they always purchase at least one of defendants’ other 
products as well, though they are not required to do so. 
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4. Products and services associated with YOURCAREEVERYWHERE 
YOURCAREEVERYWHERE is used on a free, publicly available website that contains 
general information related to health and wellness, such as diseases and conditions, 
healthcare news, pregnancy and childbirth, child and teen care, heart care, mental health, and 
exercise and nutrition. The mark is displayed with this logo: 
 
There is a YOURCAREEVERYWHERE mobile app as well. On the app, the mark is 
displayed with this logo:  
 
Users of the website or app may register for an account, which allows them to track 
certain health and wellness data, such as data from a fitness band. 
Healthcare providers can license a co-branded landing page that includes the 
YOURCAREEVERYWHERE mark and logo, along with information from the provider. If a 
patient of that provider has an account with YOURCAREEVERYWHERE, the patient can 
link the account with the provider’s website and access the provider’s 
YOURCAREUNIVERSE patient portal.  
Defendants offer marketing consultation services to healthcare providers under the 
YOURCAREEVERYWHERE mark. 
14 
 
Defendants’ revenue for YOURCAREEVERYWHERE comes from a combination of 
third-party advertisements on the website, co-branded landing pages, and marketing 
consultation services. 
5. Defendants’ customers 
Approximately half of the customers for Enterprise (MEDHOST’s EHR system) are 
specialty hospitals or special providers and the other half are short-term acute care facilities. 
The “bulk” of MEDHOST’s 700 to 800 Enterprise customers are “middle tier” hospitals. 
Approximately 10 to 15 percent are “small” hospitals. MEDHOST does not “really compete . 
. . very much” for “large tertiary care” hospitals, Dkt. 88 (Anderson Dep.,at 168-69), but it 
does have some large healthcare facility customers. The average Enterprise license costs 
$400,000. 
6. Defendants’ marketing and sales 
MEDHOST promotes YOURCAREUNIVERSE products and services to hospitals in 
conjunction with its promotion of Enterprise as a way to engage patients and potential 
patients, promote patient loyalty, expand the company’s brand presence and encourage 
patients to use the healthcare facilities’ portal. In accordance with this purpose, MEDHOST 
markets YOURCAREUNIVERSE products and services as part of a broader “patient 
engagement solution” to “open the door” to sell other MEDHOST products, including its 
EHR system. Dkt. 170, ¶ 73. MEDHOST receives a subscription fee from any customer who 
buys the “YOURCAREUNIVERSE suite,” which includes the YOURCAREEVERYWHERE 
“consumer engagement solution.” 
MEDHOST promotes its products and services at national conferences, some of 
which Epic attends as well. 
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C. Third party uses of “care” and “everywhere” 
In the healthcare industry, the word “care” is commonly used and “everywhere” is “a 
fairly common term,” though not as common as “care.” Dkt. 105 (Kiesau Dep., at 137-38). 
Since 2004, the careeverywhere.com domain name has been owned by Care Everywhere, 
LLC, a healthcare IT vendor that has no affiliation with Epic. The company identifies itself as 
“a certified software medical device company focused on integrating point-of-care medical 
devices such as infusion pumps and vital sign monitors with hospital information systems to 
improve patient safety, nursing productivity, and documentation.” Care Everywhere, 
“About,” available at http://www.careeverywhere.com/ce/about/ (last visited March 14, 2017). 
 The following healthcare organizations use the phrase “care everywhere” as well: 
 Primary Care Medical Center has a website called primarycareeverywhere.com; 
 
 a public charity called Kids Care Everywhere has a website called 
kidscareeverywhere.org; 
 
 a company called CommuniTake uses the phrase “Mobile Care Everywhere”; 
 a home healthcare provider uses the phrase “Quality Care Everywhere”; 
 United Healthcare uses the phrase “Health Care Everywhere” on their website and 
marketing materials; 
 
 The Washington State Hospital Association uses the phrase “Essential Care, 
Everywhere” on their website; 
 
 The U.S. National Institute for Health uses the phrase “Remote Access to Care 
Everywhere”; 
 
 Axxess Technology Solutions uses the phrase “Powering Care Everywhere.” 
 
Other registered marks in healthcare industry include EXPERT CARE EVERYWHERE, 
EVERYWHERE CARE, and CARE. VIRTUALLY EVERYWHERE. 
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D. Potential competition between Epic and defendants 
Epic does not offer a website that includes general health and wellness content, under 
its CARE EVERYWHERE mark or otherwise. 
According to Epic’s CEO, companies called Cerner, ALLscripts, MEDITECH, and 
McKesson are Epic’s “direct” competitors, meaning that they appear on shortlists with Epic 
after a prospective customer issues a request for proposal. Ninety percent of the time, Epic 
competes with Cerner or Allscripts. Epic has identified two instances in which it competed 
with MEDHOST for a contract regarding an EHR system. In both instances, the company 
was a “long-term acute care” and “rehab” business. Dkt. 103 (Hutchinson Dep., at 56).5 
 As of March 2016, Epic had 38 percent of the market share for EHR systems in all 
physician practices, rehab and long-term care facilities, and hospitals of all bed sizes. 
MEDHOST’s market share was approximately one percent. As to hospitals having more than 
200 beds, Epic had 32 percent of the market and MEDHOST had approximately one 
percent. 
E. Confusion about the parties’ marks 
 Epic has not identified any instances of actual confusion between the CARE 
EVERYWHERE and YOURCAREEVERYWHERE marks, products, or services. Epic’s CEO 
believes that defendants’ YOURCAREEVERYWHERE mark is likely to be confusing for 
Epic’s Community Connect participants, but not its direct customers. Dkt. 96 (Faulkner 
                                                 
5 Epic states generally in its proposed findings of fact that it has competed with MEDHOST 
on other occasions, Dkt. 170, ¶ 86, but it does not identify any other examples. Instead, it 
cites generally to an exhibit that includes a list of dates and names of various companies, 
along with more than 20 pages of typed notes that are mostly sentence fragments. Dkt. 141-
1. This citation with no corresponding explanation is insufficient to establish the proposed 
fact, particularly because the exhibit is far from self-explanatory. 
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Dep., at 31-32, 270-71). Epic has not conducted a survey to determine whether any of its 
customers are likely to be confused. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Legal standard 
Epic is asserting claims for trademark infringement and unfair competition under both 
state and federal law. The parties agree that each of these claims requires proof of a likelihood 
of confusion and that the standard under both state and federal law is the same. Fortres Grand 
Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc., 763 F.3d 696, 700 (7th Cir. 2014) (likelihood of confusion 
is element of both trademark infringement and unfair competition claims). The parties do 
not cite any controlling authority for the view that Wisconsin and federal law have an 
identical standard for likelihood of confusion, but neither side identifies any differences and 
both sides cite federal law only, so the parties have forfeited any arguments related to any 
difference that may exist. 
“Likelihood of confusion” in the context of trademark law has several components. 
First, the question is not whether anyone who might view the marks would be confused; 
rather, the relevant class consists of consumers who might purchase either the plaintiff’s or 
the defendant’s products or services. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Phx. Int'l Software, 
Inc., 653 F.3d 448, 455 (7th Cir. 2011). See also Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 
376, 382 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he proper inquiry centers on the confusion of consumers in 
the market for the particular products at issue.”).  
Second, as to the type of confusion, the relevant question is whether a prospective 
customer is likely to believe that the plaintiff is the source of or is otherwise affiliated with 
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the defendant’s marked products or services. Sorensen v. WD-40 Co., 792 F.3d 712, 726 (7th 
Cir. 2015) (“The keystone of trademark infringement is likelihood of confusion as to source, 
affiliation, connection, or sponsorship of goods or services.”). (There are other types of 
confusion in the context of a “dilution” or “reverse confusion” theory, e.g. Fortres Grand Corp., 
763 F.3d at 701; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Nat’l Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 466 (7th Cir. 2000), but 
Epic in not asserting those theories.)  
Third, as to the risk of confusion, “[p]ossible confusion is not enough; rather, 
confusion must be probable.” Sorensen, 792 F.3d at 726 (internal quotations omitted). 
Finally, as to the extent of confusion required, it must be more than “de minimis.” Packman v. 
Chi. Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 645 (7th Cir. 2001) (evidence of four confused customers not 
sufficient to show likelihood of confusion); Libman Co. v. Vining Indus., Inc., 69 F.3d 1360, 
1363-64 (7th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff’s claim failed without evidence that “significant fraction” 
of consumers likely to be confused); Henri's Food Prod. Co. v. Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d 352, 358 
(7th Cir. 1983) (survey showing 7.6% confusion rate weighed against finding of 
infringement). 
In assessing likelihood of confusion, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
considers seven factors: 
(1) the similarity between the marks in appearance and 
suggestion;  
(2) the similarity of the products;  
(3) the area and manner of concurrent use;  
(4) the degree of care likely to be exercised by consumers; 
(5) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark; 
(6) any evidence of actual confusion; and 
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(7) the intent of the defendant to “palm off” his product as that 
of another. 
Sorensen, 792 F.3d at 726.  
Because these are factors not elements, no one factor is controlling and the relative 
importance of the factors may depend on the facts of a particular case. AutoZone, Inc. v. Strick, 
543 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2008). See also Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 
457 F.3d 1062, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The list of factors is not a score-card—whether a 
party wins a majority of the factors is not the point. Nor should the factors be rigidly 
weighed; we do not count beans.”) (internal quotations omitted). However, the Seventh 
Circuit has stated that “the similarity of the marks, the defendant's intent, and actual 
confusion are particularly important.” AutoZone, 543 F.3d at 929. (The Seventh Circuit has 
said that “the list is not exclusive,” Nike, Inc. v. Just Did It Enterprises, 6 F.3d 1225, 1228 (7th 
Cir. 1993), but the parties do not discuss other factors in their briefs, so the court will limit 
its analysis to the above list.) 
 Likelihood of confusion is a question of fact, which means that summary judgment is 
appropriate only if no reasonable factfinder could find in favor of the nonmoving party on 
that issue. Sorensen, 792 F.3d at 726. Even if there are genuine issues of fact as to some of the 
seven factors, a court may grant summary judgment if “no reasonable jury, looking at the 
seven factors as a whole, could conclude that there is a likelihood of confusion.” Id.  
Epic cites several alternative descriptions of the summary judgment standard in 
trademark cases predating Sorensen. E.g., Door Sys., 83 F.3d at 171 (likelihood of confusion 
can be resolved on summary judgment “if the evidence is so one-sided that there can be no 
doubt about how the question should be answered”); McGraw-Edison Co. v. Walt Disney 
Prods., 787 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1986) (moving party in trademark case has “strict 
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burden” on summary judgment; “all doubts must be resolved against” moving party). See also 
AHP Subsidiary Holding Co. v. Stuart Hale Co., 1 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[A] motion 
for summary judgment in trademark infringement cases must be approached with great 
caution.”). Some of the statements are reminiscent of old discrimination cases in which 
courts stated that summary judgment “should be approached with special caution” in those 
cases, Courtney v. Biosound, Inc., 42 F.3d 414, 423 (7th Cir. 1994), and that courts should 
apply the summary judgment standard with “added rigor” in that context. Sarsha v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1038 (7th Cir. 1993).  
In more recent years, the court of appeals has clarified that the standard for summary 
judgment is the same in all cases. Bagley v. Blagojevich, 646 F.3d 378, 389 (7th Cir. 2011). In 
particular, “[i]f a genuine dispute as to a material fact exists . . . summary judgment is 
inappropriate. But that genuine dispute must be supported by sufficient evidence to permit a 
jury to return a verdict for” the nonmoving party. Id. (internal quotations and alterations 
omitted). In applying that standard, courts must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
nonmoving party, but a party cannot avoid summary judgment simply by raising  
“some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).  
These principles apply to trademark law as well. The Seventh Circuit has not 
hesitated to decide likelihood confusion as a matter of law on summary judgment when the 
plaintiff has not met its burden. E.g., Sorensen, 792 F.3d at 732; Sullivan v. CBS Corp., 385 
F.3d 772, 774 (7th Cir. 2004); Packman, 267 F.3d at 647   ; Door Sys., 83 F.3d at 173; 
Libman, 69 F.3d at 1362; Spraying Sys. Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 389 (7th Cir. 
1992). See also Fortres Grand, 763 F.3d at 705-06 (affirming dismissal of trademark claim for 
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failure state a claim upon which relief may be granted on ground that plaintiff did not 
plausibly allege likelihood of confusion); Eastland Music Group, LLC v. Lionsgate Entm’t, Inc., 
707 F.3d 869, 871-72 (7th Cir. 2013) (same). 
With this standard in mind, the court will consider each of the factors relevant to 
determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion in this case. 
B. Actual confusion 
It is undisputed that Epic has no evidence that anyone has been confused by 
defendants’ YOURCAREEVERYWHERE mark. Epic has neither pointed to customers 
expressing confusion nor conducted a survey to determine whether confusion is likely.  
Epic is correct that actual confusion is not required to show a likelihood of confusion, 
Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 960 (7th Cir. 1992), but as 
noted above, it is one of the more “important” factors. AutoZone, 543 F.3d at 929. Obviously, 
evidence showing whether customers have already been confused is highly probative of the 
question whether customers are likely to be confused in the future. See Eastland Music Group, 
707 F.3d at 871-72 (relying on absence of actual confusion to affirm dismissal of trademark 
infringement claim); Libman, 69 F.3d at 1363-64 (same). In the absence of any showing of 
actual confusion, Epic has a heavier burden to show that other factors would allow a 
reasonable factfinder to render a verdict in Epic’s favor. Libman, 69 F.3d at 1363–64 
(evidence of actual confusion may not be needed when “it is obvious just from comparing the 
products that consumers are likely to be confused as to their source”). 
C. Intent 
A defendant’s intent behind choosing its mark is another “particularly important” 
factor. AutoZone, 543 F.3d at 929. “This factor looks primarily for evidence that the 
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defendants are attempting to ‘pass off’ their products as having come from the plaintiff.” 
Packman, 267 F.3d at 644. 
Epic has adduced no evidence that defendants chose their 
YOURCAREEVERYWHERE mark out of a hope to confuse customers into believing that the 
mark is associated with Epic’s CARE EVERYWHERE mark. The evidence to the contrary is 
strong. First, it is undisputed that YOURCAREEVERYWHERE did not come out of thin air. 
Rather, at the time defendants chose the mark, they already had two other “YourCare” 
marks: YOURCARECOMMUNITY and YOURCARELINK. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Moose 
Creek, Inc., 486 F.3d 629, 637 (9th Cir. 2007) (defendant’s previous use of similar marks 
supports finding of good faith); King Research, Inc. v. Shulton, Inc., 454 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 
1972) (same). Second, when defendants tested the mark against other potential marks, 
approximately two thirds of the respondents chose YOURCAREEVERYWHERE. Universal 
Money Centers, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 22 F.3d 1527, 1531 (10th Cir. 1994) (defendant’s 
use of consumer survey to choose name supports finding of good faith). Third, defendants 
have spent $2,500,000 marketing products and services related to the mark. Procter & Gamble 
Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Inc., 485 F. Supp. 1185, 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (good faith supported 
by defendant’s “plan[] [to make] enormous expenditures in publicizing and promoting the 
[marked] products”). Cf. Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 824 F.2d 622, 627 (8th Cir. 1987) 
(intent to confuse “not likely” when defendant “conducted extensive research and 
development” in choosing mark). Finally, since adopting the YOURCAREEVERYWHERE 
mark, defendants have adopted more than a dozen additional “YourCare” marks that are part 
of defendants’ YOURCAREUNIVERSE products and services. This is compelling evidence 
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that defendants’ mark had nothing to do with Epic’s CARE EVERYWHERE brand, but was 
simply one part of defendants’ own “YourCare” brand. 
Epic argues that defendants cannot rely on its other marks because defendants have 
not established that they have a “family of marks,” which is “a group of marks having a 
recognizable common characteristic, wherein the marks are composed and used in such a way 
that the public associates not only the individual marks, but the common characteristic of the 
family, with the trademark owner.” J & J Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald's Corp., 932 F.2d 
1460, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Epic does not develop its argument and it makes little sense. 
The question whether defendants’ marks are recognized as related by the public has nothing 
to do with whether defendants intended to copy Epic’s mark. The chronology of events 
surrounding defendants’ adoption of YOURCAREEVERYWHERE shows not that 
defendants’ marks are famous but that defendants had a good reason unrelated to Epic for 
choosing the mark. 
The only evidence Epic cites in support of a finding that defendants intended to 
confuse customers is the fact that defendants were aware of Epic’s CARE EVERYWHERE at 
the time they chose to adopt YOURCAREEVERYWHERE. However, “[p]rior knowledge of a 
senior user's mark does not, without more, create an inference of bad faith.” Corbond Corp. v. 
Core Foam, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 910, 919 (W.D. Wis. 2005) (quoting Playtex Prods, Inc. v. 
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 390 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2004)); Bishops Bay Founders Grp., Inc. v. 
Bishops Bay Apartments, LLC, 301 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913 (W.D. Wis. 2003) (“[T]he intent 
factor requires a showing of defendant's ‘intent to confuse customers, not merely the intent 
to use a mark that is already in use somewhere else.’”) (quoting Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Meridian Ins. Grp., Inc., 128 F.3d 1111, 1120 (7th Cir. 1997)). Under the circumstances of 
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this case, when all other facts point strongly to other justifications for choosing the mark, the 
court sees little probative value in defendants’ refusal to choose a different name despite its 
knowledge of Epic’s mark.  
D. Similarity of marks 
For obvious reasons, the similarity of the parties’ marks is a key part of the likelihood 
of confusion analysis. At first look, this factor appears to support Epic because defendants’ 
mark includes the same words as Epic’s. However, a review of the words that make up the 
mark is simply the beginning of the analysis, not the end.  
“Trademark law protects the source-denoting function of words used in conjunction 
with goods and services in the marketplace, not the words themselves.” Fortres Grand Corp., 
763 F.3d at 705-06. See also James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 275 
(7th Cir.1976) (“[T]he test is not whether the public would confuse the marks, but whether 
the viewer of an accused mark would be likely to associate the product or service with which 
it is connected with the source of products or services with which an earlier mark is 
connected.”). Therefore, the court “must compare the marks in light of what happens in the 
marketplace and not merely by looking at the two marks side-by-side.” AutoZone, 543 F.3d at 
930 (internal quotations omitted). In other words, context is key. Savin Corp. v. Savin Grp., 
391 F.3d 439, 458 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he impression conveyed by the setting in which the 
mark is used is often of critical importance.”) (internal quotations omitted). Even if one mark 
incorporates the other, as in this case, or even if the marks are identical, the context in which 
the marks appear may show that confusion is not likely. E.g., Fortres Grand, 763 F.3d at 705-
06 (“[B]oth marks are merely ‘clean slate’ or ‘the clean slate.’ But juxtaposed against the 
weakness of all the other factors, this similarity is not enough.”); Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen 
25 
 
Corp., 725 F.2d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The two marks viewed in isolation are indeed 
identical, but their similarity must be considered in light of the way the marks are 
encountered in the marketplace and the circumstances surrounding the purchase of the 
[parties’ products].”). 
In this case, defendants’ marks most often appear with other visual cues indicating 
that they do not come from Epic. In particular, it is undisputed that the logos for CARE 
EVERYWHERE and YOURCAREEVERYWHERE bear no resemblance to each other and 
that defendants’ YOURCAREEVERYWHERE mark generally appears with other marks 
related to YOURCAREUNIVERSE or MEDHOST or both. These are factors that tend to 
reduce the likelihood of confusion. Sullivan, 385 F.3d at 777-78 (two “Survivor” marks not 
likely to cause confusion because consumers in marketplace never see defendant's mark alone 
but always surrounded by words, “Outplay, Outlast, Outwit”); Packman, 267 F.3d 645-46 
(although words in marks were identical, no likelihood of confusion when “the appearance 
and placement of the words are distinct” and “[a]ll of defendants' products—and their tags—
prominently display the [defendant’s name]”); G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 
873 F.2d 985, 999 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding district court’s conclusion that “prominent 
house mark . . . [and] use of a prominent brand name . . . dispelled any significant likelihood 
of confusion”). See also Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Intl., Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 
515 (6th Cir. 2013) (defendant “scrupulously avoided . . . confusion by choosing a starkly 
different logo that it prominently displays on its [products] and on all its sales and marketing 
literature”); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1030 (9th Cir. 
2004) (likelihood of confusion diminished “when mark clearly identifies its source with its 
sponsor's name”); Kwik-Site Corp. v. Clear View Mfg. Co., 758 F.2d 167, 178 (6th Cir. 1985) 
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(“The most common and effective means of apprising intending purchasers of the source of 
goods is a prominent disclosure on the container, package, wrapper, or label of the 
manufacturer's or trader's name and when that is done, there is no basis for a charge of unfair 
competition.”) (internal quotations omitted). Cf. AutoZone, 543 F.3d at 930-31 (likelihood of 
confusion between “AutoZone” and “OilZone” supported by similar logos). 
Epic offers two reasons for resisting the conclusion that logos and the use of other 
marks obviates any possible confusion caused by defendants’ mark. First, Epic points out that 
the YOURCAREEVERYWHERE mark does not always appear with a logo and it does not 
always appear with defendants’ other marks. Second, Epic says that a prominent logo or 
accompanying mark does not dispel a belief that Epic is sponsoring defendants’ products and 
services, even if it is clear that Epic is not the source of the mark.  
 As to Epic’s first contention, Epic identifies only a tiny number of examples in which 
YOURCAREEVERYWHERE does not appear with a logo and one or more of defendants’ 
marks and no instances in which YOURCAREEVERYWHERE does not appear with either the 
logo or other marks. Such a small number of instances of potential confusion is not sufficient 
to sustain a claim. Packman, 267 F.3d at 645; Libman, 69 F.3d at 1363-64.  
It is true that a logo cannot limit confusion when the mark is communicated orally 
rather than visually. Meridian Mut. Ins., 128 F.3d at 1115-16; Unity Health Plans Ins. Co. v. 
Iowa Health Sys., 995 F. Supp. 2d 874, 889 (W.D. Wis. 2014); Corbond, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 
916. Although defendants give prospective customers presentations about 
YOURCAREEVERYWHERE products and services, Epic does not identify any instances in 
which visual materials are not provided as well.  
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Even if the court assumes that visual cues are not always present, by Epic’s own 
assertion, defendants market their products and services related to 
YOURCAREEVERYWHERE along with other products from MEDHOST and 
YourCareUniverse. Dkt. 170, ¶ 73. Epic fails to explain how a prospective customer could 
believe that Epic is the source of YOURCAREEVERYWHERE if defendants are pitching 
potential customers an array of MEDHOST products and services at the same time, 
particularly those related to YourCareUniverse, which would make it clear that the “common 
thread” among the products was “YourCare” rather than “CareEverywhere.” Ty, Inc. v. Jones 
Grp., Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 899 (7th Cir. 2001) (customers likely to believe that “common 
thread” in different marks was “salient” portion of marks).  
Epic again observes that defendants have not established that they have a “family of 
marks,” and again that observation has little relevance in this context. Regardless whether a 
prospective customer would know when viewing YOURCAREEVERYWHERE in isolation 
that it is part of a family of marks, he or she does not need to know this if those marks are 
presented together. Epic says in its brief that defendants market 
YOURCAREEVERYWHERE without other “YourCare” products and services, but the 
proposed findings of fact it cites actually support the opposite conclusion. E.g., Dkt. 170, ¶ 
73 (“MEDHOST markets YOURCAREEVERYWHERE to hospitals as part of an even 
broader suite of YourCareUniverse EHR products and services.”); id., ¶ 74 
(“YourCareUniverse does not have any customers who have independently purchased 
YOURCAREEVERYWHERE products and services, without purchasing other 
YourCareUniverse and/or MEDHOST products and services.”). 
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Epic’s alternative contention is that accompanying YOURCAREEVERYWHERE with 
a logo or one or more of defendants’ marks does not reduce the potential for a customer to 
believe that Epic is sponsoring defendants’ products or services. Epic cites A.T. Cross Co. v. 
Jonathan Bradley Pens, Inc., 470 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1972), in which the court stated that a pen 
manufacturer could not dispel confusion between the marks “Cross” and “La Crosse” by 
adding the words “by Bradley” to its pen because “a purchaser could well think plaintiff had 
licensed defendant as a second user.” Id. at 692. However, a pen cannot be compared to the 
parties’ products and services at issue; the potential customers in this case are not simply 
viewing a box of software at Best Buy with the name YOURCAREEVERYWHERE on it. 
Again, when YOURCAREEVERYWHERE is being offered as a “suite” along with 
YourCareUniverse and MEDHOST products, it is unclear how customers could believe that 
defendants are simply acting as Epic’s licensees. 
In sum, the words in the parties’ marks overlap, but the context in which those marks 
appear does not support a finding that customers are likely to be confused. 
E. Customer degree of care in choosing a product or service 
“A consumer exercising a high degree of care in selecting a product reduces the 
likelihood of confusing similar trade names.” Heartsprings, Inc. v. Heartspring, Inc., 143 F.3d 
550, 557 (10th Cir. 1998). But before the court can determine the level of care that a 
prospective customer is likely to exercise, it is important to first define who that customer is. 
As noted above, the relevant class of customers consists of those who could be making a 
choice between a purchase from Epic or one of the defendants. Phx. Intl. Software, 653 F.3d at 
455. Because Epic does not sell products or services to patients, the court need not consider 
whether patients who see Epic’s CARE EVERYWHERE in the MyChart patient portal might 
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be confused by seeing defendants’ YOURCAREEVERYWHERE on their health and wellness 
website or mobile app. 
The customers Epic discusses in its summary judgment materials are potential 
purchasers of EpicCare (Epic’s EHR system) and Community Connect participants, who use 
EpicCare by purchasing a license from one of Epic’s direct customers. But Epic has all but 
conceded that its direct customers are not likely to be confused by defendants’ 
YOURCAREEVERYWHERE mark in light of the high degree of care they exercise when 
making a purchasing decision. When asked about whether customers would be confused by 
defendants’ mark, plaintiff’s CEO initially testified that she believed that the mark “could be 
very confusing, not to our direct customer, but to the connect customer.” Dkt. 96 (Faulkner 
Dep., at 31-32) (emphasis added). She later qualified this statement slightly by saying that it 
is “not impossible” that Epic’s direct customers would be confused. Id. at 270-71. “Not 
impossible” is a far cry from “likely” or “probable,” which is what Epic must show. Sorensen, 
792 F.3d at 726. 
Even if the CEO’s testimony is not treated as a concession on this issue, the 
undisputed facts show that Epic’s direct customers are not likely to be confused because they 
exercise a high degree of care in choosing whether to purchase from Epic or defendants. It is 
undisputed that the licensing fees for an EHR system are hundreds of thousands of dollars at 
a minimum, that the process for purchasing an EHR system can take six months to a year, 
that Epic’s direct customers are sophisticated healthcare organizations, and that many of 
them hire consultants to assist them in making a purchase. Dkt. 146, at 22 (“Epic does not 
dispute that most healthcare providers that end up buying MEDHOST’s and Epic’s EHR-
products and services exercise a substantial degree of care in making purchasing decisions. 
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Epic admits that the offerings are relatively expensive and the ultimate purchasers tend to be 
sophisticated in their purchasing decisions.”) (internal citations omitted).  
In other words, these are not ordinary consumers who are making a split-second 
decision and can be easily misled. AutoZone, 543 F.3d at 933 (confusion less likely when 
customers “are particularly sophisticated or deliberative”); AM Gen. Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler 
Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 827-28 (7th Cir. 2002) (“None of the relevant motor vehicles is the sort 
of low-priced item to which a consumer might devote little careful thought.”); Rust Envt. & 
Infrastructure, Inc. v. Teunissen, 131 F.3d 1210, 1217 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding district 
court’s conclusion that “the consumers' sophistication . . . and high cost of [services] indicate 
that such confusion is unlikely”); Dorr-Oliver, 94 F.3d at 383 (“It is not possible that any of 
these companies, all of which own and operate Dorr-Oliver clamshells, will be confused by 
Fluid-Quip's introduction of a competitive line of clamshells.”). See also Jet, Inc. v. Sewage 
Aeration Sys., 165 F.3d 419, 423 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[E]xperts in their fields [are] less likely to 
be confused than lay people.”). 
The process for direct customers to make a purchase is similar to the one at issue in 
Washington National Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, 727 F. Supp. 
472, 473 (N.D. Ill. 1990), which involved a dispute between two insurance companies that 
offered managed care plans. Although the words in the marks were similar (“AdvantEDGE” 
versus “The Advantage Program”), the court held that no confusion was likely, in part 
because of the degree of care used by customers: 
Since “managed care” is essentially a group insurance product, 
the market for such programs is composed largely of well-
informed and sophisticated purchasers. A company seeking an 
insurance plan for its employees, for example, will typically 
solicit proposals, carefully review and compare the benefits 
offered by each insurance carrier, and then make a selection with 
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the advice of a brokerage firm or consultant. Such a detailed 
selection process, which could last several months, presents little 
opportunity for confusion. 
Id. at 475 (internal citations omitted). The court agrees with this analysis and concludes that 
it applies at least as strongly to the sales process for Epic’s prospective direct customers. 
As to participants in the Community Connect program, there is some debate between 
the parties regarding whether those participants should “count” as Epic’s customers at all 
because Connect participants generally have a contract with one of Epic’s direct customers 
rather than with Epic itself. Defendants cite multiple documents from Epic indicating that it 
does not consider Connect participants to be customers. Dkt. 169, ¶¶ 14 and 61 (Connect 
participants not identified as customers on Epic’s website and published customer data). In 
fact, Epic cites no evidence that it makes any money from the Connect participants. 
However, defendants propose a fact that Epic may receive an economic benefit from Connect 
participants as a result of greater usage of the EHR system by direct customers. Id., ¶ 58. It is 
surprising that Epic does not present more evidence on such a key question, but the court 
will assume for the purpose of defendants’ motion that the indirect benefit that Epic receives 
is sufficient to place Connect participants in the class of relevant customers who may be 
confused.  
This assumption does not get Epic very far because Connect participants cannot be 
accurately described as an ordinary consumer either. They tend to be small hospital 
administrators or healthcare providers, so they are still relatively sophisticated, and they are 
still purchasing an expensive license that should heighten their degree of care. The parties do 
not say a great deal about the process a Connect participant goes through to purchase a 
license, but it is undisputed that Connect participants generally share patients with one of 
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Epic’s direct customers and learn about the Connect program through them. This suggests 
that participation in the Connect program is determined more through relationships than 
through marketing, so if Connect participants are not exercising a high degree of care (and 
simply becoming a participant out of convenience or a direct customer’s recommendation), 
that lack of care is benefitting Epic, not harming it. 
This factor clearly favors defendants. Perhaps realizing this, Epic says little about the 
factor, devoting much of this section in its brief to the doctrine of “initial interest confusion,” 
which can apply even in some circumstances in which customers exercise a high degree of 
care. The court will discuss that theory in a separate discussion at the end of the opinion.  
F. Strength of the mark 
 “The ‘strength’ of a trademark refers to the mark's distinctiveness, meaning its 
propensity to identify the products or services sold as emanating from a particular source.” 
Sorensen, 792 F.3d at 731 (internal quotations omitted). Marks that are descriptive of the 
goods or services are not as strong as marks that are arbitrarily selected or consist of made up 
names. The stronger the mark, the more likely similar marks will cause confusion. Telemed 
Corp. v. Tel-Med, Inc., 588 F.2d 213, 219 (7th Cir. 1978) (“A mark that is strong because of 
its fame or its uniqueness is more likely to be associated in the public mind with a greater 
breadth of products or services than is a mark that is weak because it is very much like similar 
marks.”). See also Playtex Prod., 390 F.3d at 163 (“When there is widespread recognition of a 
mark among consumers, there is an increased likelihood that consumers will assume it 
identifies the previously familiar user, and therefore an increased likelihood of consumer 
confusion if the new user is in fact not related to the first.”) (internal quotations and 
alterations omitted).  
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A mark can be inherently distinctive and therefore strong or an otherwise weaker 
mark can acquire strength over time because the mark’s owner has taken steps to make the 
mark well known. Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Rest., LLC, 360 F.3d 125, 130131 (2d Cir. 
2004). When a mark has acquired strength, it has developed a “secondary meaning.” Corbond, 
356 F. Supp. 2d at 918. In this case, Epic has made little showing that its mark is strong, 
either inherently or through development of secondary meaning.  
1. Inherent strength 
As to inherent strength, it is undisputed that the terms “care” and “everywhere” are 
relatively commonplace in the healthcare industry and defendants have cited various 
instances in which the phrase “care everywhere” is used by others in the healthcare industry. 
When a party chooses more common words as its trademark, the owner must be prepared to 
“tolera[te] . . . a certain degree of confusion on the part of consumers.” KP Permanent Make-
Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 122 (2004). 
Also, Epic’s and defendants’ marks are relatively descriptive or at most suggestive. 
Packman, 267 F.3d at 638 (“The law recognizes five categories of trademarks, in ascending 
order of distinctiveness: generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful.”); Sorensen, 
792 F.3d at 724-25 (“A descriptive term ordinarily names a characteristic of a product or 
service. . . . [A] suggestive [term] “requires some operation of the imagination.”) (internal 
quotations omitted). Epic’s mark refers to a product that allows patients and providers to 
access healthcare records “everywhere,” that is, across difference providers; defendants’ mark 
refers to products and services that allow patients to review healthcare information 
“everywhere” by using defendants’ website or mobile app. The descriptive nature of Epic’s 
mark makes it less distinctive and thus weaker. TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc'ns, Inc., 244 
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F.3d 88, 101 (2d Cir. 2001) (“If the similarity between the two marks would lead consumers 
to assume the similar marks were chosen because they describe similar, desirable attributes of 
the products, the similarity is less likely to invite a mistaken assumption that the products 
must come from the same source.”). In fact, Epic admits that there has been confusion 
surrounding its own mark in that some people referred to it as “Care Anywhere” and others 
simply had difficulty recalling the name.  
Epic observes repeatedly in its discussion of the strength of its mark and throughout 
the rest of its brief that its mark is “incontestable,” but that status simply restricts the bases 
on which the registration can be challenged. It does not control an analysis whether the mark 
is strong in the context of a likelihood of confusion analysis. Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition § 21, cmt. i (1995) (“A few cases suggest that an incontestable mark is ‘strong’ for 
purposes of the likelihood of confusion analysis, or at least that incontestability is a factor to 
be considered in assessing the strength of a mark. However, the test for likelihood of 
confusion is based on the perceptions of consumers in the marketplace, which are ordinarily 
unaffected by the status of a mark's registration.”) (citing Munters Corp. v. Matsui Am., Inc., 
909 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1990)). Thus, Epic cannot rely on its mark’s status to escape the 
conclusion that the mark has little inherent strength. 
2. Acquired strength 
Acquired strength can be determined in a number of different ways: direct consumer 
testimony; consumer surveys; the exclusivity, length, and manner of use of the mark; amount 
and manner of advertising for the mark; the owner’s amount of sales and number of 
customers; how established the owner’s place in the market is; and intentional copying. Echo 
Travel, Inc. v. Travel Assocs., Inc., 870 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th Cir. 1989). See also AutoZone, 543 
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F.3d at 933 (“The AutoZone mark is displayed prominently on more than 3,000 stores 
nationwide, and it has been the subject of hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of 
advertising since 1987.”). 
Epic has not conducted a survey to determine the strength of its mark. Such evidence 
can be “particularly persuasive,” Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 13, cmt. e (1995), 
but it is also rare. Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prod., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
Epic says that it has spent approximately $100 million on marketing and promotion since 
2014, but that figure is unhelpful because Epic does not identify what portion of that figure 
relates to CARE EVERYWHERE. 
On the other hand, Epic has been using its mark since at least 2004 and it is 
undisputed that Epic and its CARE EVERYWHERE products and services are “widely 
known” in the “industry.” Dkt. 170, ¶ 46 and Dkt. 169, ¶ 90. The parties provide little other 
information on this issue and they do not say specifically whether CARE EVERYWHERE is 
well known among the class of prospective Connect participants, which, as the court 
discussed above, are the only relevant consumers who could be confused. The only fact related 
to this issue proposed by the parties is that Connect participants generally hear about Epic 
through interactions with Epic’s direct customers, Dkt. 169, ¶ 60, which could limit 
awareness of the mark to those who are most likely to be predisposed to seeking a license 
from Epic anyway.  
Although the record is unclear regarding the strength of Epic’s mark as to the most 
relevant customers, for the purpose of defendants’ motion, the court will assume that 
potential Connect participants are aware of the mark and associate it with Epic’s 
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interoperability application.6  Making this assumption, however, does little to buttress Epic’s 
claim in light of the many other factors favoring defendants.  
G. Similarity of products 
Epic’s CARE EVERYWHERE is associated with an interoperability application; 
defendants’ YOURCAREEVERYWHERE is associated primarily with a health and wellness 
website and mobile app. It is undisputed that these are not competing products and that Epic 
does not offer any product that competes with the YOURCAREEVERYWHERE products and 
services. This counsels against a finding of likely confusion. Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point 
Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 282 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[M]ark similarity is not necessarily 
determinative of likely confusion, particularly when the products do not directly compete.”). 
As Epic points out, the lack of directly competing products is not fatal to its claims if 
the products are similar enough that a customer could reasonably think that the products 
come from the same source. CAE, Inc. v. Clear Air Eng’g, Inc., 267 F.3d 660, 679 (7th Cir. 
2001). For example, in AutoZone, 543 F.3d at 931, the plaintiff was a car parts store and the 
defendant provided oil changes and car washes. Although there was no direct competition, 
the court concluded that the defendant’s services were sufficiently related to the plaintiff’s 
products that a consumer might believe that the plaintiff was “venturing into a related service 
                                                 
6 As evidence of the weakness of Epic’s mark, defendants cite several examples in which 
Epic’s customers used CARE EVERYWHERE incorrectly, either not attributing the mark to 
Epic or attributing the mark to the wrong products and services. However, the cases 
defendants cite involve an owner’s failure to use a mark consistently, not a third party’s 
failure to comply with a license. Sorensen, 792 F.3d at 731; Gimix, Inc. v. JS & A Grp., Inc., 
699 F.2d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 1983). Defendants cite no authority for the view that an owner’s 
lax enforcement of the mark renders it weaker. Perhaps a customer’s failure to attribute the 
mark to the correct product could be circumstantial evidence that the customer is unfamiliar 
with the mark, but this is weak evidence at best, particularly because of the small sample size 
defendants provided.   
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industry,” particularly because the defendants’ marks were so similar to the plaintiff’s. Id. 
Although a trademark owner may not lose sales immediately because of that type of 
confusion, it might still harm the owner because of a loss of good will that results from a 
negative experience the customer has with the other business. (It might also hinder the 
owner’s ability to expand its business into related areas, CAE, 267 F.3d at 681, but Epic does 
not suggest that it has any intent to provide any product or service that falls under the 
YOURCAREEVERYWHERE mark.) 
Although the parties debate whether Epic and defendants sell “related” products, they 
say little about the question raised in AutoZone, which is whether a relevant customer could 
reasonably expect Epic to sponsor a general health and wellness website. Because defendants 
offer both their website and an EHR system, perhaps it “would not be that surprising,” id., if 
Epic did the same thing. However, cases like AutoZone and CAE are distinguishable because 
the defendants in those cases were calling their businesses by a name that was similar to the 
plaintiff’s name. In this case, there is no suggestion that anyone would think that defendants 
are masquerading as an affiliate of Epic. Thus, the relevant question is whether a customer 
would be likely to think that Epic would either (1) use a mark that is related to an 
interoperability application on products and services related to a health and wellness website 
or (2) allow a third party to do so. Because Epic fails even to develop an argument that it 
would be reasonable for a customer to connect those unrelated products with one mark, the 
court concludes that this factor favors defendants as well.  
H. Area and manner of use 
The Seventh Circuit has summarized this factor as follows: “[C]ourts look at whether 
there is a relationship in use, promotion, distribution or sales between the goods or services of 
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the parties. We also look to whether the parties use the same channels of commerce, target 
the same general audience, or use similar marketing procedures.” Sorensen, 792 F.3d at 730 
(internal citations and quotations omitted). The key question is whether the plaintiff and 
defendant are competing for the same customers. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. Cracker 
Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 735 F.3d 735, 739 (7th Cir. 2013); Packman, 267 F.3d at 646; 
Smith Fiberglass Prod., Inc. v. Ameron, Inc., 7 F.3d 1327, 1330 (7th Cir. 1993). “[L]ikelihood of 
confusion [is] diminished where there [is] minimal, if any, overlap in customers.” Packman, 
267 F.3d at 646. 
As noted above, Epic has no products or services that compete directly with 
defendants’ YOURCAREEVERYWHERE products and services. However, both Epic and 
MEDHOST sell an EHR system. (Both Epic and defendants have a patient portal as well, but 
Epic’s portal is part of its EHR system and Epic does not does not develop a separate 
argument about the portal.) Defendants argue that their EHR system does not compete with 
Epic’s because MEDHOST’s EHR system is significantly cheaper than EpicCare and directed 
at smaller healthcare organizations. United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1353 (11th 
Cir. 1987) (“[P]rice differential may be relevant to the determination of whether the mark is 
likely to confuse.”); Farberware, Inc. v. Mr. Coffee, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 291, 302 (D. Del. 1990) 
(“Although the fact that Mr. Coffee's product is meant to appeal to modest consumers, while 
Farberware's is directed to the more upscale, does not negate that these products compete, it 
does lead the Court to consider another relevant factor, namely the price differential.”). 
Epic denies that the parties target different customers, but the evidence it cites is 
limited. Epic has identified only two instances in which the companies competed for the 
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same customer. This does not mean that competition will not increase in the future, but it 
limits the relevance of this factor considerably. 
To sum up, the following factors diminish any likelihood of confusion in this case: 
 no customers (or anyone else) have expressed confusion about defendants’ 
mark; 
 
 Epic has not presented any survey evidence suggesting that confusion is likely; 
 strong evidence supports a conclusion that defendants chose their mark as part 
of a group of “YourCare” marks and did not intend to deceive customers; 
 
 when prospective customers are presented with defendants’ 
YOURCAREEVERYWHERE mark, it is generally in the context of defendants’ 
other marks, particularly YOURCAREUNIVERSE; 
 
 Epic’s marked products and services have no logical relationship to defendants’ 
marked products and services; 
 
 the parties have little overlap in the customers they serve; 
 
 both marks are relatively descriptive and use commonplace words; 
 
 many potential customers are sophisticated and deliberative; 
 
 less sophisticated customers who are potential Connect participants are more 
likely to choose a product because of a relationship with an existing customer 
rather than a marketing pitch. 
In light of these factors, which tip strongly in defendants’ favor, the similarity in the 
words used in the marks and the fact that Epic and its mark may have strong name 
recognition among some customers are not sufficient to show a likelihood of confusion in this 
case. Even if a customer who is familiar with Epic’s mark sees defendants’ mark, it should be 
clear from the context that Epic is neither the source nor the sponsor of defendants’ mark. 
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I. Initial interest confusion 
Epic attempts to save its claims by relying on the doctrine of “initial interest 
confusion,” which occurs when the defendant “lur[es] potential customers away from [the 
plaintiff] by initially passing off its goods [or services] as those of the [plaintiff’s] even if 
confusion as to the source of the goods is dispelled by the time any sales are consummated.” 
Dorr-Oliver, 94 F.3d at 382. The Seventh Circuit has summarized initial interest confusion as 
a “bait and switch” technique, in which a competitor will try to “get its foot in the door” and 
affect a purchasing decision by confusing the consumer. Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire 
Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 1999).  
In Promatek Industries, Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812 (7th Cir. 2002), the 
court gave the example of someone “posting a sign with another's trademark in front of one's 
store.” Even if the customer realizes after she enters that the store is not actually associated 
with the trademark owner, by then it may be too late. “Customers believing they are entering 
the first store rather than the second are still likely to mill around before they leave,” id. at 
812-13, and potentially make a purchase that should have gone to the trademark owner. The 
facts in Promatek involved the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark as a metatag, so that a 
consumer conducting an internet search for the plaintiff’s site might find the defendant’s site 
instead. The court concluded that a consumer who clicked on a link for the wrong site might 
soon realize his error, but still would be exposed to the defendant’s products and give the 
defendant an opportunity to steal sales.7  
                                                 
7 Using another party’s trademark to misdirect an internet search appears to be one of the 
more common situations in which the initial interest confusion doctrine has been applied 
E.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1024–26 (9th Cir.2004); 
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Nat. Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 464 (7th Cir. 2000); Brookfield Commc'ns, 
Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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The facts in this case bear no similarity to those in which a court accepted a theory of 
initial interest confusion as plausible. To begin with, as the court’s reference to a “bait and 
switch” suggests, cases involving initial interest confusion often include some indication that 
the defendant is trying to deceive customers who are looking for products or services from the 
plaintiff. E.g., Checkpoint Sys., 269 F.3d at 296 (“[C]ourts look at evidence that the defendant 
intentionally adopted the plaintiff's mark to create confusion among consumers making 
purchasing decisions.”) (citing Dorr–Oliver, 94 F.3d at 382–83); Wolf Appliance v. Viking Range 
Corp., 686 F. Supp. 2d 878, 891-92 (W.D. Wis. 2010) (reasonable jury could find that 
defendant copied plaintiff’s trade dress “because it wanted customers to believe that plaintiff 
and defendant are now affiliated”). As noted above, defendants have provided compelling 
evidence that their adoption of the YOURCAREEVERYWHERE mark had nothing to do 
with Epic and Epic has presented no evidence that defendants have attempted to use their 
mark to lure any customers away from Epic.  
Courts are most likely to apply the doctrine of initial interest confusion doctrine in 
circumstances involving directly competing products, particularly when the potential 
purchasers are lay consumers making decisions in a relatively short amount of time with 
limited information. Compare Promatek, 300 F.3d at 812 (initial interest confusion applied 
when parties were direct competitors and customers exercised low degree of care); Brookfield 
Commc’ns, 174 F.3d at 1057 (finding initial interest confusion actionable because “in the 
Internet context, . . . entering a web site takes little effort—usually one click from a linked 
site or a search engine's list; thus, Web surfers are more likely to be confused as to the 
ownership of a web site than traditional patrons of a brick-and-mortar store would be of a 
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store's ownership.”), and Checkpoint Sys., 269 F.3d at 296-97 (“When products are similar, a 
firm is more likely to benefit from the goodwill of a firm with an established mark. And when 
consumers do not exercise a high level of care in making their decisions, it is more likely that 
their initial confusion will result in a benefit to the alleged infringer from the use of the 
goodwill of the other firm.”), with Sensient Techs. Corp. v. SensoryEffects Flavor Co., 613 F.3d 
754, 766 (8th Cir. 2010) (declining to apply doctrine of initial interest confusion; “although 
the products are similar, the parties agree the customers are sophisticated and exercise a 
relatively high degree of care in making their purchasing decisions”), and AM Gen. Corp., 311 
F.3d at 827-28 (“Any similarity in the grilles [of two competing car companies] does not 
present a risk of a ‘bait and switch’ effect” because “[n]one of the relevant motor vehicles is 
the sort of low-priced item to which a consumer might devote little careful thought.”), and 
Rust Envt. & Infrastructure, 131 F.3d at 1217 (no initial interest confusion in case in which 
“the relevant market of consumers is composed of sophisticated buyers of services in a highly 
specialized technical field”). 
 As discussed throughout this opinion, the purchasing decisions at issue in this case 
involve sophisticated consumers making expensive purchases often over a long period of time 
after acquiring much information. All of these factors counsel against the possibility that 
initial interest confusion is at all likely.   
As Epic points out, the doctrine can apply to more expensive items and more 
sophisticated customers, e.g., Wolf Appliance, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 891-92 (consumers buying 
expensive stoves), and the leading treatise cites one case before the Trademark Trial and 
Appeal Board in which the board applied the doctrine to an “extended purchasing process” 
involving expensive computer software. 4 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition 
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§ 23:6 (4th ed. 2008) (citing Hrl Assocs. Inc., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1819 (T.T.A.B. July 21, 1989)). 
However, in those cases, the confusion lasted long enough to give the defendant some 
competitive advantage over the trademark owner, suggesting that there must be some basis 
from which to infer that the defendant has influenced a customer’s decision to make a 
purchase. Wolf Appliance, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 891–92 (consumer influenced to consider 
purchasing stove because it featured competitor’s red knobs); Hrl Assocs., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1819 (initial interest confusion applies if the trademark owner “may be precluded from 
further consideration by the potential purchaser in reaching his or her buying decision (which 
may, in turn, prevent [the trademark owner] from making a sale)”). See also Gibson Guitar 
Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539, 552 (6th Cir. 2005) (initial interest 
confusion does not apply if products appear similar from distance but are distinct upon closer 
inspection); Checkpoint Sys., 269 F.3d at 295-96 (“[I]f the initial interest confusion does not 
ultimately result in a purchasing decision, this factor counsels against finding the likelihood 
of confusion.”). 
In this case, Epic has not articulated any plausible scenario under which a potential 
customer could be confused by defendants’ mark long enough to have any influence on a 
purchasing decision. In its brief, Epic offers the following hypothetical:  
[A] hospital administrator that has received medical records 
through Epic’s CARE EVERYWHERE interoperability software 
(or is Googling to find other offerings related to CARE 
EVERYWHERE in order to expand) that is then pitched by 
MEDHOST, using the YOURCAREEVERYWHERE suite as an 
entrée for EHR or other products/services by MEDHOST, could 
mistakenly believe the two offerings are associated and, 
therefore, will work as seamlessly as her interactions with Epic’s 
software. Thus, MEDHOST would be able to get in the door 
unfairly by trading on the goodwill associated with Epic’s mark.  
Dkt. 146, at 23-24.  
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Epic has presented no evidence that internet searches will produce misleading results, 
so its reference to “Googling” is a nonstarter. But if one removes that reference from the 
hypothetical, all that remains is a vague and conclusory allegation, devoid of any context. 
Epic does not identify any particular scenario, likely or otherwise, in which a potential 
customer could be confused into believing that Epic is the source or sponsor of defendants’ 
YOURCAREEVERYWHERE products and services.  
What would the “pitch” identified in Epic’s hypothetical look like? Under what 
circumstances could defendants make this pitch in a way that the administrator would be 
unable to discern from the context of the pitch that defendants and not Epic are the source 
and sponsor of defendants’ mark? Epic’s hypothetical rests on an assumption that the 
administrator is in a factual vacuum in which she knows nothing except that CARE 
EVERYWHERE is Epic’s mark and defendants are trying to use a similar mark to sell her a 
different product. But that assumption is inconsistent with the undisputed facts that 
defendants market YOURCAREEVERYWHERE along with other YourCareUniverse 
products and services and that it is generally clear from the context of the 
YOURCAREEVERYWHERE mark that defendants are the source. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. 
Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1245 (10th Cir. 2013) (“Perhaps in the abstract, one who 
searches for a particular business with a strong mark and sees an entry on the results page will 
naturally infer that the entry is for that business. But that inference is an unnatural one when 
the entry is clearly labeled as an advertisement and clearly identifies the source, which has a 
name quite different from the business being searched for.”); Network Automation, Inc. v. 
Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1154 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[C]lear labeling might 
eliminate the likelihood of initial interest confusion.”) (internal quotations omitted); Rust 
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Envt. & Infrastructure, 131 F.3d at 1217 (upholding district court’s conclusion that initial 
interest confusion unlikely when defendant’s “employees take precautions by introducing and 
advertising themselves as part of a new firm”). 
“[I]nitial interest confusion is not assumed and must be proven by the evidence.” 
Sensient Techs., 613 F.3d at 766 (quoting 4 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition 
§ 23:6 (4th ed. 2008)). Particularly when one considers all the factors that would diminish 
the likelihood of initial interest confusion in this case, Epic’s failure to clearly articulate any 
likely scenario under which a customer would be confused is fatal to its claims. Libman, 69 
F.3d at 1363 (“[A] finding of likely confusion can no more be based on pure conjecture or a 
fetching narrative alone than any other finding on an issue on which the proponent bears the 
burden of proof.”). 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the court agrees with defendants that Epic’s claims are fundamentally 
speculative. Although defendants’ mark includes the same words as Epic’s mark, under the 
circumstances of this case, that is not enough. Perhaps confusion is “not impossible,” Dkt. 96 
(Faulkner Dep., at 27-71), but “no reasonable [factfinder], looking at the seven factors as a 
whole, could conclude that there is a likelihood of confusion.” Sorensen, 792 F.3d at 726.  
ORDER 
IT IS ORDERED that: 
1. The motion for summary judgment filed by defendants YourCareUniverse, 
Inc., MEDHOST of Tennessee, Inc., and MEDHOST Direct, Inc., Dkt. 113, is 
GRANTED. 
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2. The following motions are DENIED as moot: defendants’ motion to exclude 
the testimony of Michael Cohen, Dkt. 118; defendants’ motion to strike Epic’s 
jury demand, Dkt. 120; Epic’s motion to amend its damages report, Dkt. 194; 
defendants’ motion for leave to amend their answer to assert the affirmative 
defense of abandonment, Dkt. 202; defendants’ motion to compel, Dkt. 224; 
Epic’s motion for an extension of time, Dkt. 226; and Epic’s motion to compel, 
Dkt. 228. 
3. The clerk of court is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendants and 
close this case. 
Entered March 22, 2017. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
      /s/ 
      ________________________________________ 
      JAMES D. PETERSON 
       District Judge 
 
 
